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Abstract
A common feature of the Hungarian, Irish, Spanish and Turkish higher education
admission systems is that the students apply for programmes and are ranked according
to their scores. Students who apply for a programme with the same score are tied.
Ties are broken by lottery in Ireland, by objective factors in Turkey (such as date
of birth) and other precisely dened rules in Spain. In Hungary, however, an equal
treatment policy is used, students applying for a programme with the same score
are all accepted or rejected together. In such a situation there is only one decision
to make, whether or not to admit the last group of applicants with the same score
who are at the boundary of the quota. Both concepts can be described in terms of
stable score-limits. The strict rejection of the last group with whom a quota would be
violated corresponds to the concept of H-stable (i.e. higher-stable) score-limits that
is currently used in Hungary. We call the other solutions based on the less strict
admission policy as L-stable (i.e. lower-stable) score-limits. We show that the natural
extensions of the Gale-Shapley algorithms produce stable score-limits, moreover, the
applicant-oriented versions result in the lowest score-limits (thus optimal for students)
and the college-oriented versions result in the highest score-limits with regard to each
concept. When comparing the applicant-optimal H-stable and L-stable score-limits
we prove that the former limits are always higher for every college. Furthermore,
these two solutions provide upper and lower boundaries for any solution arising from
a tie-breaking strategy. Finally we show that both the H-stable and the L-stable
applicant-proposing score-limit algorithms are manipulable.
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1 Introduction
Gale and Shapley [14] introduced a model and solution concept to solve the college ad-
missions problem fty years ago1. In their model they suppose that the students submit
preference lists containing the colleges they apply to, and each college ranks their ap-
plicants in a strict order and also provides an upper quota. Based on the submitted
preferences a central body computes a fair solution. The fairness criterion they propose is
stability, which essentially means that if an application is rejected then it must be the case
that the college has lled its quota with applicants better than the applicants concerned.
They gave an ecient method to nd a stable matching and they proved that it is actually
optimal for the students, in the sense that no student can be admitted to a better college
in another stable matching. The Gale-Shapley algorithm has linear time implementation
(see e.g. Knuth [19]), which means that the running time of the algorithm is proportional
to the number of applications. Another attractive property of this matching mechanism,
proved by Roth [22], is that it is strategy-proof for the students, i.e., no student can be
admitted to any better college by submitting false preferences.
Later, it turned out (Roth [24]) that the algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley had
already been implemented in 1952 in the National Resident Matching Program and has
been used since to coordinate junior doctor recruitment in the US. Moreover, the very
same method has been implemented recently in the Boston [4] and New York [3] high
school matching programs. However, college admissions are still organized in a completely
decentralized way in the US, with all its aws, that is unraveling through early admissions
and coordination problems caused by too many or not enough students admitted. See
some representative stories on American college admissions practices in the blog of Al
Roth [34].
There are many other countries where higher education admissions are more regulated,
but not yet centralized. In Russia, the common timetable of admissions prevents unravel-
ing and the use of 'original documents' provided better coordination regarding the number
of students admitted, but yet the solution is far from being optimal.2 In the UK, there is a
common platform to manage the admissions by UCAS [35]. There are centralized admis-
sion framework, but the decisions and actions of the users (students and higher education
institutions) are still decentralized.
Finally, there are some countries which do have centralized matching schemes for higher
education admissions. In particular, there are scientic papers on the Chinese [27, 28],
German [10, 26, 30], Hungarian [6, 7], Spanish [21] and Turkish [5] schemes.3
The Chinese higher education admissions system is certainly the largest in the world,
with more than 20 million students enrolled in 2009 [28]. The system is based on a
centralized exam, called the National College Entrance Examinations, which provide a
score assigned to each student. This induces a ranking of the students by universities.
The matching process (see [27]) is a kind of Boston mechanism with some extra tweaks
that makes the system manipulable and controversial. The German clearinghouse for
1The 2012 Nobel-Prize in Economic Sciences has been awarded to Alvin Roth and Lloyd Shapley for
the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design.
2Each applicant applies to at most ve universities, but does not inform universities about her pref-
erences among them. Universities rank students using results of Unied State Exams. Two 'admission
rounds' are organized that are similar to the rst two steps of a deferred acceptance procedure. After the
second step, universities that still have empty seats are allowed to organize additional admissions.
3However, we shall note that regrettably these scientic papers deal only with some special features
of these systems (as we also do in this paper) so not all the aspects of these schemes are described. But
luckily, there is a new European research network, called Matching in Practice [33], one of whose aim is to
collect and describe current matching practices in Europe. So hopefully we will have a better picture and
understanding on the current practices, at least in Europe.
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higher education admissions deals only with a small segment of subjects (about 13,000
students from the total 500,000, see [30]). The clearinghouse is a mixed system, in the
rst phase (for the best students) the Boston-mechanism is used and in the second phase
the college-proposing Gale-Shapley, so the process is not incentive compatible for the group
of best students [10, 26].
The Hungarian, Irish, Spanish and Turkish higher education matching schemes are all
based on a centralized scoring system. The Irish system has not been described yet in
a scientic paper to the best of our knowledge.4 In the other three countries students
are assigned a score with regard to each programme they applied to, these scores coming
mainly from their grades and entrance exams. The scores of a student may dier in two
programmes, as when calculating the score of a student for a particular programme, only
those subjects are considered which are relevant for that programme. The solution of the
admission processes are represented by the so-called score-limits, which are referred to as
'base scores' in Turkey [5] and 'cuto marks' in Spain. The score-limit of a programme
means the lowest score that allows a student to be admitted to that programme. The score-
limits together with the preferences of the students naturally induce a matching, where
each student is admitted to the rst place on her list where she achieved the score-limit.
In Turkey [5] the ties are broken according to the date of birth of the students and
the college-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm is used. In Spain the scoring method is
sucient(the admission marks are from 5 to 14 with 3 decimal fractions, and some further
priority rules are also used), so ties are very unlikely. They use the applicant-proposing
Gale-Shapley algorithm with the special feature of limiting the length of the preference
lists, a setting that creates strategic issues that were studied in detail by Romero-Medina
[21] and Calsamiglia et al. [11].
In fact, in most applications where ties may occur, the programme coordinators break
these ties. In the high school matching schemes in New York [3] and Boston [4] a lottery
is used for breaking ties. However, this may lead to suboptimal solutions as Erdil and
Erkin [12] point out, but according to the study by Abdulkadiroglu et al [1] this is the
only way to keep the mechanism strategy-proof. In the Scottish Foundation Allocation
Scheme [32], where the junior doctors are matched to hospitals, the organizers attempt to
break the ties in such a way that in the resulting matching as many doctors are allocated
as possible (see Irving and Manlove [17]).5
In contrast, in the Hungarian higher education admission scheme [31] the ties are not
broken, therefore the students applying for a particular programme with equal scores are
either all accepted or all rejected. We call this an equal treatment policy.
In particular, the ties are handled in the following way in Hungary. No quota may be
violated, so the last group of students with the same score, with whom the quota would be
exceeded, are all rejected. There is however an alternative policy, that could be followed
where the quotas may be exceeded by the admission of the last group of students with the
4From the information published at the website of the Central Applications Oce [29] it seems that
the college-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm is used in Ireland with some special features. One is that
students can apply for 'level 8' and 'level 7/6' courses simultaneously, and these applications are processed
separately, so a student may receive more than one oer at a time. There are deadlines for accepting
oers and if oers are rejected then further oers are made by the higher education institutions, so the
mechanism is somewhat decentralized. The tie-breaking is based on 'random-numbers' assigned to students
with regard to each programme they applied for, so the ties are broken dierently for dierent programmes
involving perhaps the same applicants.
5In SFAS [32], applicants are ranked by NHS Education for Scotland in a so-called master list, in order
of score each applicant has a numerical score allocated partly on the basis of academic performance and
partly as a result of the assessment of their application form. The range of possible scores (approximately
40 100) is much smaller than the number of applicants (around 750 each year), so there are ties of
substantial length in the master list.
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same score, but only if there were unlled places left otherwise.
As we will show in Section 3, both concepts can lead to matchings that satisfy special
stability conditions based on score-limits that we formalize in Section 2. We refer to
the rst, more restrictive solution as H-stable (i.e., higher-stable) score-limits and we call
the second, more permissive solution L-stable (i.e., lower-stable) score-limits. Note that
these stable score-limit concepts generalize the original notion of stability by Gale and
Shapley, since they are equivalent in the case of no tie. In Section 3, we show how one can
extend the Gale-Shapley algorithm to nd H-stable and L-stable score-limits. Moreover,
in Section 4 we prove that the applicant-oriented versions provide the minimal stable
score-limits (therefore they are the best possible solutions for the applicants), whilst the
college-oriented versions provide maximal stable score-limits (therefore, they are the worst
possible solutions for the applicants). We note that the above results are deducible from
some general theorems on substitutable choice functions by Kelso and Crawford [18] and
Roth [23], as it was very recently demonstrated by Fleiner and Janko [13]. We describe
these arguments in detail at the end of Section 4.
In Section 5 we show that comparing the H-stable and L-stable score-limits, the L-
stable score-limits are more favorable for the applicants as they are lower. In particular, we
show that no college can have a higher score-limit in the applicant-optimal L-stable solution
than in the applicant-optimal H-stable solution (and the same applies for the applicant-
pessimal solutions produced by the college-oriented versions). Interestingly, we also show
that the applicant-optimal solution produced after a tie-breaking is always between these
two kinds of solutions. Therefore the matchings corresponding to the H-stable and L-
stable score-limits may provide upper and lower boundaries for every applicant regarding
her match in a scheme which uses any kind of tie-breaking strategy. Finally, in Section
6 we give examples showing that neither the H-stable nor the L-stable version of the
applicant-oriented score-limit algorithm is strategy-proof. We conclude in Section 7.
2 The denition of stable score-limits
Let A = fa1; a2; : : : ; ang be the set of applicants and C = fc1; c2; : : : ; cmg be the set of
colleges, where qu denotes the quota of college cu. Let the ranking of the applicant ai be
given by a preference list P i, where cv >i cu denotes that cv precedes cu in the list, i.e.
the applicant ai prefers cv to cu. Let s
i
u be ai's nal score at college cu. Final scores are
considered to be positive integers for all acceptable applicants. The students with scores
below a common minimum threshold are rejected automatically (currently this minimum
score is 240 in Hungary with a maximum score of 500, which applies for every study). In
the model we use zero as a minimum threshold.
The score-limits of the colleges are represented with a non-negative integer mapping
l : C ! N. An applicant ai is admitted and allocated to a college cu if she achieves the
score-limit at college cu, and that is the rst such place in her list, i.e. when s
i
u  l(cu),
and siv < l(cv) for every college cv such that cv >i cu.
If the score-limits l imply that applicant ai is allocated to college cu, then we set the
Boolean variable xiu(l) = 1, and 0 otherwise. Let xu(l) =
P
i x
i
u(l) be the number of
applicants allocated to cu under score-limits l.
Furthermore, let lu;t be dened as follows: lu;t(cu) = l(cu) + t and l
u;t(cv) = l(cv) for
every v 6= u. That is, we increase the score-limit of college cu by t (or decrease it if t is
negative), but we leave the other score-limits unchanged.
To introduce the H-stable score-limits, rst we dene the corresponding feasibility
notions. Score-limits l are H-feasible if xu(l)  qu for every college cu 2 C. That is,
the number of applicants may not exceed the quota at any college. This means that the
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group of students with next lower scores, with whom the quota would be exceeded, are
all rejected. Score-limits l are L-feasible if for every college cu 2 C such that xu(l)  qu
it must be the case that xu(l
u;1) < q. So the quotas may be exceeded at any college, but
only with the worst group of students who are admitted there with equal scores.
We say that score-limits l are H-stable (resp. L-stable) if l are H-feasible (L-feasible)
and for each college cu either l(cu) = 0 or l
u; 1 are not H-feasible (resp. L-feasible). Thus
H-stability means that we cannot decrease the score-limit of any college without violating
its quota assuming that the others do not change their limits. L-stability means that no
college cu can admit a student if at least qu of its current assignees have a higher score,
but otherwise the score limits must be as low as possible. H-stability is the concept that
is currently applied in the Hungarian higher education matching scheme.
We note that in case of no tie (i.e. every pair of applicants have dierent scores at each
college), then the two feasibility and stability conditions are the same and they are both
equivalent to the original stability concept dened by Gale and Shapley. The correspon-
dence between stable score-limits and stable matchings in case of strict preferences was
rst observed by Balinski and Sonmez [5] in relation with the Turkish college admissions
scheme (where ties do not occur due to a tie-breaking strategy based on the age of the
applicants). Furthermore Azevedo and Leshno [2] have also used this observation in a
general college admissions model involving a continuum number of students.
3 Stable score-limit algorithms
Both the H-stable and L-stable score-limit algorithms are natural extensions of the Gale{
Shapley algorithm. The only dierence is that now, the colleges cannot necessarily select
exactly as many of the best applicants as their quotas allow, since the applicants may
have equal scores. If the scores of the applicants are all dierent at each college then
these algorithms are equivalent to the original one. In this section we will present the
applicant-proposing and the college-proposing score-limit algorithms. For simplicity we
describe these algorithms with regard to the H-stability concepts only and we add some
information about the L-stable versions in brackets whenever they dier from the H-stable
versions.
College-oriented algorithms:
In the rst stage of the algorithm, let us set the score-limit at each college independently to
be the lowest value such that, when all applicants are considered, the number of applicants
oered places does not exceed its quota (resp. may exceed the quota but only if without
the last tie of these students the quota is unlled). Let us denote these score-limits by
l1. Obviously, there can be some applicants who are oered places by several colleges.
These applicants keep their best oer, and reject all the less preferred ones. Moreover,
their less preferred applications are withdrawn, which means that less preferred colleges
remove those applicants from the lists of considered applicants.
In the subsequent stages, the colleges check whether their score-limits can be further
decreased, since some of their oers may have been rejected in the previous stage, hence
they look for new students to ll the empty places. So each college sets its score-limit
independently to be the least possible that keeps the solution H-feasible (resp. L-feasible)
considering their actual applications. If an applicant gets an oer from a new, better
college, then she accepts the best oer, at least temporarily, and rejects or withdraws her
other, less preferred applications.
Formally, let lk be the score-limit after the k-th stage. In the subsequent stage, at
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each college cu, the largest integer tu is chosen, such that tu  lk(cu) and xu(lu; tuk )  qu
(resp. if xu(l
u; tu
k )  qu then xu(lu; tu+1k ) < qu). That is, by decreasing its score-limit
by the largest score tu that keeps the solution H-feasible (resp. L-feasible), i.e., where the
number of applicants oered a place by cu does not exceed its quota (resp. may exceed the
quota but only if without the last tie of these students the quota is unlled), by supposing
that all other score-limits remained the same. For each college cu let lk+1(cu) := l
u; tu
k (cu)
be the new score-limit. Again, some applicants can be oered a place by more than one
college, so xu(lk+1)  xu(lu; tuk ). Obviously, the new score-limits remain feasible.
Finally, if no college needs to decrease its score-limit then the algorithm stops. The
H-stability (resp. L-stability) of the nal score-limits is obvious by denition. Let us
denote the corresponding solutions of the H-stable and L-stable versions by lHC and l
L
C ,
respectively.
Applicant-oriented algorithms:
Let each applicant propose to her rst choice in her list. If a college receives more appli-
cations than its quota, then let its score-limit be the lowest value such that the number of
provisionally accepted applicants does not exceed its quota (resp. may exceed the quota
but only if without the last tie of these students the quota is unlled). We set the other
score-limits to be 0.
Let the score-limits after the k-th stage be lk. If an applicant has been rejected in
the k-th stage, then let her apply to the subsequent college in her list, say cu, where she
achieves the actual score-limit lk(cu), if there remains such a college in her list. Some
colleges may receive new proposals, so if the number of provisionally accepted applicants
exceeds the quota at a college (resp. exceeds the quota and without the last tie of these
students the quota is still lled), then it sets a new, higher score-limit lk+1(cu).
Again, for each such college cu, this is the lowest score-limit such that the number of
applicants oered a place by cu does not exceed its quota (resp. may exceed the quota
but only if without the last tie of these students the quota is unlled), by supposing that
all other score-limits remained the same. This means that cu rejects all those applicants
that do not achieve this new limit.
The algorithm stops if there is no new application. The nal score-limits are obviously
H-feasible (resp. L-feasible). The solution is also H-stable (resp. L-stable), because after
a score-limit has increased for the last time at a college, the rejected applicants move
on to less preferred applications during the algorithm. So if the score-limit in the nal
solution were decreased by one for this college, then these applicants would accept the
oer, and the solution would not remain H-feasible (resp. L-feasible). Let us denote the
corresponding solutions by the H-stable and L-stable applicant-oriented versions by lHA
and lLA, respectively. The following result is therefore immediate.
Theorem 3.1. The score-limits lHC and l
L
C obtained by the college-oriented score-limit
algorithms are H-stable and L-stable, respectively. The score-limits lHA and l
L
A obtained by
the applicant-oriented score-limit algorithms are H-stable and L-stable, respectively.
4 Optimality of the outputs
It is easy to give an example to show that not only some applicants can be admitted by
preferred places in lHA as compared to l
H
C , but the number of admitted applicants can also
be larger in lHA (and the same applies for the L-stable setting). We say that score-limits
l are better than l for the applicants if l  l, i.e., if l(cu)  l(cu) for every college
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cu. In this case every applicant is admitted to the same or to a preferred college under
score-limits l than under l.
Theorem 4.1. Given a college admission problem with scores, lHC are the worst possible
and lHA are the best possible H-stable score-limits for the applicants, i.e. for any H-stable
score-limits l, lHA  l  lHC holds.
Proof. Suppose rst for a contradiction that there exists a H-stable score-limit l and a
college cu such that l(cu) > lHC (cu). During the college-oriented algorithm there must be
two consecutive stages with score-limits lk and lk+1, such that l  lk and l(cu) > lk+1(cu)
for some college cu.
Obviously, lu; tuk (cu) = lk+1(cu) by denition. Also, xu(l
u; tu
k )  qu < xu(lu; 1 ), where
the rst inequality holds by denition of tu, as we choose the new limit for college cu such
a way that the number of temporarily admitted applicants does not exceed its quota. The
second inequality holds by the H-stability of l. So there must be an applicant, say a1,
who is admitted to cu at l
u; 1
 but not admitted to cu at l
u; tu
k .
On the other hand, the indirect assumption implies that lu; tuk (cu) = lk+1(cu) 
l(cu)   1 = lu; 1 (cu). Applicant a1 has a score of at least lu; tuk (cu), which is enough
to be accepted to cu, so she must be admitted to some college cv under l
u; tu
k (cu) which
is preferred to cu. Obviously a1 must be also admitted to cv under lk. But the H-stability
of l implies that l(cv) > lk(cv), a contradiction.
To prove the other inequality, we suppose for a contradiction that there exists H-stable
score-limits l and a college cu such that l(cu) < lHA (cu). During the applicant-oriented
algorithm there must be two consecutive stages with score-limits lk and lk+1, such that
l  lk and l(cu) < lk+1(cu) for some college cu. At this moment, the reason for the
incrementation is that more than qu students are applying for cu with a score of at least
l(cu). This implies that one of these students, say ai, is not admitted to cu under l
(however she has a score of at least l(cu) there). So, by the H-stability of l, she must be
admitted to a preferred college, say cv under l. Consequently, ai must have been rejected
by cv in a previous stage of the algorithm, and that is possible only if l(cv) < lk(cv), a
contradiction.
Theorem 4.2. Given a college admission problem with scores, lLC are the worst possible
and lLA are the best possible L-stable score-limits for the applicants, i.e. for any L-stable
score-limits l, lLA  l  lLC holds.
Proof. Suppose rst for a contradiction that there exist stable score-limits l and a college
cu such that l(cu) > lLC(cu). During the college-oriented algorithm there must be two
consecutive stages with score-limits lk and lk+1, such that l  lk and l(cu) > lk+1(cu)
for some college cu.
This assumptions imply that xu(l
u; tu+1
k ) < qu  xu(l). Here, the rst inequality
holds by the L-feasibility of lk+1, and the second inequality by the L-stability of l. At the
same time, by our assumption, l(cu) > lk+1(cu), so l(cu)  lk+1(cu) + 1 = lu; tu+1k (cu).
From the two above statements it follows that there must be an applicant, say a1, who
has a score su(a1)  l(cu) and is admitted to cu under l, but is not admitted to cu under
lu; tu+1k . So a1 must have a seat at some college cv under l
u; tu+1
k such that cv >a1 cu.
Obviously, a1 is also admitted to cv under lk. But a1 is not admitted to cv under l,
therefore lk(cv) < l(cv), a contradiction.
To prove the other inequality, we suppose for a contradiction that there exist stable
score-limits l and a college cu such that l(cu) < lLA(cu). During the applicant-oriented
algorithm there must be two consecutive stages with score-limits lk and lk+1, such that
l  lk and l(cu) < lk+1(cu) for some college cu.
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At this moment, the reason for the incrementation is that more than qu students are
applying for cu with score at least l(u), and cu can choose a new score-limit lk+1(cu) =
lu; tuk (cu), where tu > l(cu)  lk(cu).
This implies that one of those students, who are admitted by cu under lk+1, say a1, is
not admitted to cu under l. However she has a score higher than score-limit l(cu) there.
So, by the L-stability of l, she must be admitted to a preferred college, say cv, under l.
Consequently, in the applicant-proposing procedure a1 must have been rejected by cv at
some previous stage, and that is possible only if l(cv) < lk(cv), a contradiction.
General arguments with choice functions
As we mentioned in the Introduction, our results presented in Sections 3 and 4 are de-
ducible from some general theorems on substitutable choice functions by Kelso and Craw-
ford [18] and Roth [23], as Fleiner and Janko [13] pointed out. The selection of the colleges
can be described by their choice functions. For a college u and a set of applicants X, let
Chu(X) denote the set of selected applicants. A choice function Chu is substitutable (or
comonotone) if X  Y implies (X n Chu(X))  (Y n Chu(Y )), which means that the
set of applicants rejected from a set X must be also rejected from its superset Y . The
choice functions of the colleges satisfy this condition with respect to both the L-stable
and H-stable score limits. That is, if the colleges consider a larger set of applications
then no application that has been rejected can turn to be acceptable in any case. Kelso
and Crawford [18] showed that if the choice functions are substitutable on both sides of
a many-to-one markets then there always exists a stable matching, moreover there is one
stable matching that is optimal for the colleges. Roth [23] showed the existence of an
applicant-optimal matching for this model (and also for the more general many-to-many
case).
Furthermore, Fleiner and Janko [13] gave new results on the structure of stable match-
ings that applies for L-stable and H-stable score limits as well. They noticed that the choice
function of the colleges under L-stability satisfy the path-independence property, that is
for any set of applicants X  Y , Chu(Y )  X  Y implies Chu(X) = Chu(Y ). There-
fore the theorem of Blair [9] implies that the set of stable matchings corresponding to
L-stable score-limits forms a lattice. However, the path-independence property does not
hold for the choice functions related to H-stable score-limits. Yet, the stable matchings
corresponding to H-stable score-limits form a lattice, as Fleiner and Janko proved with
the use of new concept, called four-stability.
5 Comparison of the H-stable and L-stable versions
Intuitively it seems that the L-stable version of the algorithm is more applicant-friendly
than the H-stable version. It turns out that we can prove the following result.
Theorem 5.1. The score-limits obtained in the L-stable version of the applicants-oriented
procedure are always equal or lower than the score-limits obtained in the H-stable version
of the applicant-oriented procedure: i.e. lLA  lHA .
Proof. Part I. Some colleges may have number of admitted students less than or equal
to their quota under lHA , i.e. qu   xu(lHA )  0. Each college cu has a "waiting" list of
applicants, who would prefer to be admitted to cu rather than to their currently assigned
colleges.
Let us apply some random tie-breaking to the original preference relation of the col-
leges. Each applicant ai will get a new score p
i
u  siu such that no two applicants will have
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the same score at any college. Moreover, the new scores satisfy the following condition: if
sju < siu, then p
j
u < siu. These p
i
u scores are positive real numbers. For example, if there
are three applicants with scores s1u = s
2
u = 1, s
3
u = 2, the new scores might be p
1
u = 1,
p2u = 1:5, p
3
u = 2.
After that the following procedure is organized. If the number of applicants on cu
college's waiting list is more than the number of empty seats then college cu sets it's new
score-limit mHA (cu)  lHA (cu) equal to the score piu of the last admitted applicant in its
waiting list. Otherwise let mHA (cu) = 0. Note that the new score-limits m
H
A are non-
negative real numbers. This means that each college make oers to applicants from its
waiting list who t the new score-limit.
Some applicants may receive more than one proposal. Each applicant accepts one,
from the most preferred college, and rejects the others. If there remain any empty seat in
colleges then the second step is organized in the same manner and so on. Thus essentially
we run a college-proposing deferred-acceptance procedure with regard to the new scores.
At the end of this procedure some new score-limits mR are achieved such that mR  lHA
by construction. These new score-limits mR and the corresponding matching R are
stable (in the Gale-Shapley sense) according to new strict preferences of colleges, also by
construction.
Part II. For the strict preference prole and corresponding scores piu from Part I we
can organize applicant-proposing deferred acceptance procedure (which is, in case of strict
preferences, equivalent to both the H-stable and L-stable applicant-oriented algorithms).
The resulting matching RA is, of course, stable under strict preferences. Furthermore, we
can dene score-limits mRA that are equal to the score of the last accepted applicant if
college has no empty seats and to 0 otherwise. These score-limits mRA must be the lowest
among all stable score-limits by the optimality theorem of Gale and Shapley. Therefore
mRA  mR in particular.
Part III. Now we deal with mRA score-limits. Let us get back to the original weak order
preferences of the colleges and corresponding applicants' scores siu. For each college with
xu(m
R
A) = qu we can construct a "waiting" list of applicants, who prefer college cu to their
current matches under mRA.
Let us now apply the L-feasibility concept. At the rst stage each college sets it's new
score-limit lRA(cu)  mRA(cu), that is the largest value, which allows to admit equal or more
than the quota under weak order preferences as L-feasibility prescribes. For example, if
there are two applicants with the same score siu, such that one of them is admitted to cu
under mRA and the other is on the waiting list then we have to 'treat them equally', so we
should lower the score-limit. Each college makes oers to these additional applicants.
Some applicants may receive more than one oer from colleges; in this case each
applicant chooses the most preferred college. After that if there is any college with number
of admitted applicants less than its quota then a new round starts. Each college chooses
new, lower, L-feasible limit, and so on. That is we run the college-proposing score-limit
procedure under L-stability. At the end, some new score-limits lL are achieved such that
lL  mRA by construction. These new score limits are L-feasible and L-stable, obviously.
Part IV. For each L-stable score-limit lL we know that lLA  lL from Theorem 4.2,
where lLA are stable score-limits obtained by the L-stable applicant-oriented algorithm.
Now we can construct the following inequalities: lLA  lL  mRA  mR  lHA . So
we can conclude that for any college admissions problem with score-limits the outcome
by the L-stable applicant-oriented algorithm is better for the applicants (i.e. yields lower
score-limits) than the outcome of the H-stable applicant-oriented algorithm.
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Theorem 5.2. The score-limits obtained in the L-stable version of the college-oriented
procedure are always equal or lower than the score-limits obtained in the H-stable version
of the college-oriented procedure: i.e. lLC  lHC .
Proof. Part I. Let us consider the lLC score-limits. Some colleges may have number of
admitted students more than or equal to their quota, xu(l
L
C)  qu.
Let us apply a random tie-breaking to the original preference relation of the colleges.
Each applicant ai gets a new score p
i
u  siu such that no two applicants have the same
score at any college, and these new scores do not contradict with the original ordering.
Moreover, if sju < siu, then p
j
u < siu. These p
i
u scores are positive real numbers.
After that the following procedure is organized. At the rst stage each college sets its
new score-limit mLC(cu)  lLC(cu) such that according to the new scores piu the number
of applicants who t this score-limit would be exactly qu. The new score-limits m
L
C are
non-negative real numbers. Let mLC(cu) be equal to 0 if the number of students admitted
to cu is less than cu's quota and otherwise let m
L
C(cu) be equal to the lowest score p
i
u of
any admitted student.
Some applicants are rejected from colleges they were assigned under lLC . Each rejected
applicant then applies to the subsequent college in her list. Colleges receive new applica-
tions and, if necessary, raise the limits so that number of accepted applicants are equal
to their quota. Some new applicants may be rejected, so a second round is organized in
the same manner and so on. Thus we run an applicant-proposing deferred-acceptance
procedure with respect to the perturbed strict preferences. At the end, some new score-
limits mR are obtained such that mR  lLC by construction. These new score-limits are
stable (in the Gale-Shapley sense) according to the new strict preferences of colleges by
construction.
Part II. For strict preference prole and corresponding scores piu from Part I we can
organize a college-oriented deferred-acceptance procedure. The resulting score-limits mRC
are, of course, stable according to these strict preferences. Furthermore, the corresponding
score-limits must be the lowest among all stable score-limits by the optimality theorem of
Gale and Shapley [14], so mRC  mR.
Part III. Now we deal with mRC score-limits. For each college cu, xu(m
R
C)  qu holds
under mRC . Each college cu with number of assigned students lower than its quota has
score-limit mRC(cu) = 0. Now we get back to the original weak order preferences of the
colleges and original applicants' scores siu.
Let us now apply the H-feasibility concept. For each college we can construct a list
of applicants, who prefer college cu to their current matches under m
R
C . After that the
following deferred acceptance procedure is organized. At the rst stage each college sets
it's new score-limit lRC(cu)  mRC(cu) that is the lowest value, which allows to admit equal
or less than the quota under weak order preferences as H-feasibility prescribes. Therefore
some colleges may reject applicants. Each rejected applicant applies to the next college
in her list. Colleges receive new applications and, if necessary, raise their score-limits in
such a way that the number of accepted applicants is less than or equal to their quota.
Some applicants may be rejected and a second round is organized in the same manner and
so on. Thus we run an applicant-proposing deferred-acceptance procedure with regard
to H-stability. At the end, each applicant is either accepted to some college or rejected
by all acceptable colleges. Some new score-limits lH are achieved such that lH  mRC by
construction. These new score-limits are H-feasible and H-stable, obviously.
Part IV. For each H-stable score-limit lH we know that lHC  lH from theorem 4.1,
where lHC is a H-stable score-limit obtained by the applicant-oriented score-limit algorithm.
Now we can construct the following inequalities: lLC  mR  mRC  lH  lHC . So
we can conclude that for any college admissions problem with score-limits the outcome
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by the L-stable college-oriented algorithm is better for the applicants (i.e. yields lower
score-limits) than the outcome of the H-stable college-oriented algorithm.
Corollary 5.1. Applicant-optimal H-stable and L-stable score-limits (lHA and l
L
A) are up-
per and lower boundaries, respectively, for score-limits under any applicant-optimal stable
matching with random tie-breaking. Similar statement applies for the applicant-pessimal
score-limits (lHC and l
L
C).
Finally, we note that the proofs of Theorem 5.1 and 5.2 can be naturally extended to
get an implication that is slightly more general than the above Corollary. Suppose that
the applicants could be strictly ranked by the colleges with exact scores e, but the scoring
method used in the scheme is not ne enough, which leads to rounded scores s with ties.
We say that scores f are renements of scores s if f and s are not the same, and for any
pair of applicants ai and aj and college cu, s
i
u  f iu  eiu, siu < sju implies f iu < sju and
f iu < f
j
u implies eiu < f
j
u. Intuitively, if there exist exact scores e then a scoring method is
ner than another one if it produce scores closer to e.6
Corollary 5.2. Suppose that the applicants can be ranked with exact scores e by the
colleges, and the corresponding applicant-optimal stable score-limits are lA(e). Let s and f
be scores such that e are renements of f and f are renements of s. Let lHA (s) and l
L
A(s)
denote the applicant-optimal stable score-limits for scores s with respect to the H-stable
and L-stable concepts. Then lLA(s)  lLA(f)  lA(e)  lHA (f)  lHA (s) holds.
6 Strategic issues
Here we give two examples showing that neither of the above described score-limit algo-
rithms is strategy-proof. The manipulability from the applicants' side is only interesting
in the case of applicant-oriented algorithms, as the applicants may successfully manipu-
late the college-oriented versions even for strict preferences (i.e., for scores with no ties).
Therefore we only consider the applicant-oriented versions in the examples below.
Example 1. Suppose that we have two colleges, cu and cv with one seat in each of them,
and two applicants s1 and s2 applying to both cu and cv with a preference towards cu and
with equal scores at both places. So the preference list of the colleges and students are as
follows.
a1 : cu; cv cu : (a1; a2)
a2 : cu; cv cv : (a1; a2)
Figure 1: An example for the manipulability of the H-stable applicant-proposing algorithm
Here the only H-stable solution is the empty matching (i.e., score-limits higher than the
scores of a1 and a2 at both colleges). However, if either of the students, say a1 withdraws
her application at cu then the unique H-stable solution (under falsied preferences) is
matching where a1 is allocated to cv and a2 is allocated to cu. So the manipulator (and
actually the other student also) would improve.
6In Hungary the scoring method became ner in 2007. Until 2007 each written exam with a maximum
score of 100 had been rounded to an integer score between 0 and 15. Since 2007 the exact score of these
written exams are considered when calculating the nal scores of the students. As a result the maximum
score increased from 144 to 480 and the ties in the rankings of the colleges became less common and
between a smaller number of students.
11
The following example is essentially the same as the one that Hateld and Milgrom
[15] constructed in a dierent setting but for a similar purpose.
Example 2. Suppose that we have two colleges, cu and cv with one seat in each of them,
and three applicants a1, a2 and a3 applying to both cu and cv with the following scores,
s1u = 1, s
2
u = 1, s
3
u = 2, s
1
v = 3, s
2
v = 2 and s
3
v = 1. These can be described equivalently
with the preference lists below.
a1 : cu; cv cu : a3; (a1; a2)
a2 : cv; cu cv : a1; a2; a3
a3 : cv; cu
Figure 2: An example for the manipulability of the L-stable applicant-proposing algorithm
Here the only L-stable solution is the matching f(a1; cv); (a3; cu)g (i.e., with score-
limits l(cu) = 2 and l(cv) = 3). However, if a2 were to reverse her preferences with
regard to the two colleges then the L-stable applicant-oriented algorithm would produce
the matching f(a1; cu); (a2; cu); (a3; cv)g, where the manipulator (and actually both the two
other applicants) would improve.
7 Further notes
Regarding the Hungarian application, we would like to conduct an experiment with real
data and compute the four possible extreme stable score-limits, namely the applicant-
optimal and applicant-pessimal score-limits under H-stability and L-stability. It would
also be interesting to see how these concepts can be used in other settings, e.g. what
could be the corresponding solutions for the Boston and New York high school matching
programs.
Regarding the theoretical problems, we would like to investigate whether there is any
structure behind the H-stable and L-stable score-limits. It would also be worth studying
further the relation of solutions satisfying equal treatment policy and those produced by
tie-breaking strategies.
Finally, some manipulable stable matching mechanisms turned out to be incentive
compatible in large markets [25, 16, 20]. Our question is whether either of the applicant-
oriented stable score-limit algorithms is approximately strategyproof in large markets.
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